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Negotiation or Mediation?: An Exploration of Factors Affecting 
the Choice of Conflict Management in International Conflict 
 
Jacob Bercovitch and Richard Jackson 
 
The conditions under which negotiation or mediation are chosen in international conflict have 
been little studied. Previous research has tended to focus on the motivations and rational 
calculations of the states involved. Scant attention has been given to examining the effect of 
the context on this choice. In this article, we present a framework for studying the contextual 
conditions under which negotiation or mediation is likely to take place. Employing an 
original data set, we find that negotiation tends to be used when conflicts are relatively 
simple, of a low intensity, and when both parties are relatively equal in power. Mediation, on 
the other hand, tends to be used in disputes characterized by high complexity, high intensity, 
long duration, unequal and fractionated parties, and where the willingness of the parties to 
settle peacefully is in doubt. 
 
 
Wherever conflict occurs, the potential exists for violence or other harmful consequences. In 
the international arena, in the absence of any generally accepted ―rules of the game,‖ conflicts 
can easily escalate into highly destructive and destabilizing wars. 
 
The course of a conflict depends on how the parties manage their disagreements. Typically, 
international actors deal with conflict by taking one or more of three possible actions: 
unilateral, bilateral, or third-party interventions (Bercovitch and Houston 1996: 11). The 
unilateral mode may involve an attempt to win over the opponent through violent struggle, or 
it may involve withdrawal or avoidance. The bilateral mode implies some form of bargaining 
and compromise (i.e., negotiation). The third-party mode means the intervention of a party 
not directly involved in the conflict (i.e., adjudication or mediation). In this essay, we shall 
examine the conditions which influence the choice of negotiation or mediation as the 
preferred way of dealing with an international conflict. 
 
A significant amount of research on conflict has centered on the processes of international 
negotiation and mediation and the general effectiveness of those processes. The question of 
how negotiation or mediation begins, why parties choose one method or the other, has been 
relatively ignored. While institutionalized mechanisms exist for dealing with some types of 
conflict, giving specifications about the process and how to initiate it (e.g., arbitration for 
labor-management disputes), conflicts in the international arena generally lack such 
procedural guidelines. Very often, states apply conflict management procedures on an ad hoc 
basis only, choosing (implicitly or explicitly) from a broad range of techniques, including 
among others negotiation, mediation, arbitration, inquiry, conciliation, or referral to 
international organizations. The study presented here focuses on the conditions for 
negotiation and mediation. It is part of a broader effort to place international conflict 
management within an empirical context, and to analyze the conditions under which parties 
will enter negotiation or mediation. This essay is divided in three sections: the development 
of a theoretical understanding of negotiation and mediation; presentation of a study of 
contextual conditions that may affect their acceptance; and, utilizing an original data set, an 
exploration of some of our theoretical propositions. 
 
 
Characteristics of Negotiation and Mediation 
 
Negotiation and mediation are the primary noncoercive methods by which actors in conflict 
settle their disputes. This holds true for all levels of conflict, from the individual to the 
international. This should not be surprising, since joint, voluntary decision making obviously 
has greater advantages and fewer risks for all parties than unilateral methods or binding third-
party methods such as adjudication (Pruitt and Carnevale 1993: 2-6). In the international 
arena, negotiation and mediation are as common as conflict itself. They have been since 
relations between states began. 
 
We define negotiation as a process by which states and other actors communicate and 
exchange proposals in an attempt to agree about the dimensions of conflict termination and 
their future relationship (Bercovitch and Jackson 1997: 25-26). Mediation in many ways is an 
extension of negotiations where the parties to a dispute seek the assistance of, or accept an 
offer of help, from a party not directly involved in the conflict, to resolve their differences 
without invoking the authority of the law. The key differences between the two methods 
relate to the additional resources and expanded relationships and communication possibilities 
that a mediator brings to the conflict management. The transformation of a dyadic negotiation 
system into a triadic, mediated-negotiation system (Wall 1981) results in numerous 
possibilities for mediators to influence the relationship with, and between, the parties. 
 
Negotiation and mediation are neither uniform processes nor are they discrete activities. Each 
involves a continuous set of related processes involving actors, decisions, resources, and 
situations. Both though are highly flexible forms of voluntary, nonbinding decision making. 
Negotiation and mediation encompass a wide spectrum of behaviors that range from formal 
discussions in a multilateral forum like the United Nations, to informal conversations at an 
embassy cocktail party. Depending on the wishes of the disputing parties, negotiation or 
mediation can be conducted formally or informally, in secret or in the open, by heads of state 
or by low-level officials, with closed or open-ended agendas. International negotiation and 
mediation can also involve a diverse set of international actors, from states to international or 
regional organizations and a whole host of non-state actors (e.g., ethnic communities, 
multilateral corporations, etc.). 
 
Negotiation and mediation emerge from specific situations. Certain preconditions must exist 
for conflict management even to be contemplated, and these preconditions often form part of 
the context of negotiation and mediation. For negotiation, the pre-conditions are: 
 
(1) a low or decreasing probability of attaining conflict goals through violent struggle, 
withdrawal, or avoidance; 
(2) a decreasing value of the conflict goals, relative to the direct costs of pursuing 
those goals and relative to other goals; 
(3) a set of common or compatible interests between the parties, or at least the 
possibility of a settlement offering mutual advantages over continued conflict; and 
(4) the flexibility by each leadership to consider negotiation (Stephens 1988: 57). 
 
Since we conceive of mediation as a form of assisted negotiation, the preconditions for 
negotiation also hold for mediation. This raises the question of why international actors 
would ever contemplate mediation. That is, if the parties are sufficiently motivated to 
cooperate and see mutual advantages in a peaceful settlement, then logically they should be 
able to negotiate directly and resolve their disputes without outside intervention (Rubin 1992: 
252; Stephens 1988: 56). 
 
For this reason, additional conditions are thought to be necessary for mediation to occur. 
First, mediation is likely to be used when a dispute is long, drawn out or complex (Bercovitch 
1992: 8). Second, mediation often comes into play when the parties’ own conflict 
management efforts have reached an impasse (Bercovitch 1992: 8; Kleiboer and t’Hart 1995: 
310), or antagonism prevents conflict management from even getting under way (Stephens 
1988: 57). Third, a mediator must be available and willing to intervene (Gulliver 1979), and 
there must exist some opportunity for the mediator to intervene (Rubin 1992: 252). If the 
parties wish to avoid any outside intervention, then mediation will not take place. Lastly, 
mediation is likely to be used when the parties calculate that it will help them reach a better 
settlement than they can achieve on their own, that the mediator will provide them with a 
face-saving way out of the conflict or a means of influencing their opponent, or when 
rejecting mediation will result in greater harm than accepting it (Bercovitch 1992: 9; Kleiboer 
1996: 380; Zartman and Touval 1996: 450). 
 
Alas, states, often mired in long, drawn-out, and complex conflicts, sometimes do resist 
mediation attempts. At other times, mediation occurs without any direct negotiation between 
the parties. Furthermore, although the international system provides numerous potential 
mediators, many disputes remain unmediated. Some conflicts experience no discernible 
conflict management at all. It is not yet clear why negotiation takes place under certain 
conditions as opposed to mediation, and vice-versa. Why are some conflicts only mediated? 
Why do others resist mediation? Nor is it yet clear which factors determine the choice of 
mediation or negotiation. While international actors employ some kind of cost-benefit 
analysis during a procedural choice, it remains unclear what effect this has on its acceptance. 
We suggest that, by examining the actual conditions and the context under which negotiation 
and mediation take place, important clues can be found as to why negotiation or mediation 
takes place in some situations but not in others. 
 
We believe that this is an important area of study for two reasons. First, systematic 
knowledge about conflict management requires an explanation of how disputants come to 
employ one conflict management technique over another. Is it a rational choice? If so, what 
calculations affect the party’s choices, and how do parties coordinate their choices with those 
of their opponent? Or is it simply an implicit choice? Do parties sometimes find their 
decisions so heavily constrained that there seems to be ―only one option‖? In institutional 
settings that structure interaction through rules, norms, and standard operating procedures, it 
is relatively easy to explain why conflicts are managed in certain ways. It is far less certain to 
do so in the anarchic environment of international relations. 
 
Second, improving the effectiveness of conflict management techniques requires knowing 
when either mediation or negotiation is likely to be accepted by the parties. There is little 
point in improving the efficacy of mediation or negotiation if we cannot be sure that the 
disputants will accept it in the first instance. Knowing something about the kinds of conflicts 
where either method will be accepted will enable us to tailor strategies to specific conflicts. 
 
Studying the Choice of Negotiation or Mediation 
 
The vast majority of studies on strategic choice in conflict management have concentrated in 
the area of interpersonal conflict. They aim to discover the conditions that determine how 
individuals choose among a series of four basic strategies for coping with conflict: 
contending, avoiding, problem solving, and yielding (see Rubin, Pruitt, and Kim 1994). 
 
Two key theoretical notions about the conditions that affect choice among these strategies 
dominate the literature. The first is summarized in the ―Dual Concern Model‖ originally 
developed as a theory of individual differences in conflict style (Blake and Mouton 1964; 
Rahim 1983; Thomas 1976). This model implies that a person’s choice of strategy, or conflict 
style, is determined by the strength of two independent variables — concern about one’s own 
outcomes, and concern about the opponent’s outcomes. Other labels are sometimes given to 
the dimensions in this model. Concern about one’s own outcomes, for example, is sometimes 
called assertiveness, and concern for the opponent’s outcomes is called empathy. High 
concern for both one’s own and opponent’s outcomes will encourage problem solving. 
Avoidance and inaction are encouraged by weak concern for both outcomes. Research using 
this model examines the effect of personal and structural variables on conflict styles, as well 
as the determinants of concern for one’s own outcomes and concern for the opponent’s 
outcomes. 
 
Another important area of research into strategic choice comes from the procedural justice 
arena (Thibaut and Walker 1975 and 1978; Heuer and Penrod 1986; and Pruitt and Carnevale 
1993). This research examines disputant preferences for resolving disputes in legal settings. 
In particular, it focuses on the degree of process and decision control afforded to the parties 
by different methods, such as autocratic, arbitration, moot, mediation, and bargaining. 
Process control refers to control over the nature of interaction during conflict management, 
whereas decision control refers to the power to prescribe and enforce an outcome (LaTour et 
al. 1972). In general, research in procedural justice found that disputants prefer arbitration, as 
it provides the optimal distribution of process and decision control between disputants and 
decision makers. Interestingly, studies in this area showed that ―social and environmental 
constraints can strongly affect the desirability of different modes of conflict resolution‖ (La 
Tour et al. 1972: 351). Another study by Rubin (1980) found that when a conflict is of low 
intensity, or focused on relatively narrow issues, disputants prefer to settle their differences 
through negotiations without the intrusion of a third party. 
 
At the level of international relations, the question of procedural choice in conflict 
management has been all but ignored. Early studies gave an indication of the extent to which 
states employed different methods of conflict management. Holsti (1966) focused on 77 
international conflicts between 1919 and 1965. There were 131 conflict management attempts 
over the 77 disputes, of which 47 (35.8 percent) were negotiation; 9 (6.8 percent) were 
mediation; 11 (8.3 percent) were arbitration; 48 (36.6 percent) were referrals to an 
international organisation; and 16 (12.2 percent) were multilateral conferences. 
 
Northedge and Donelan (1971) adopted an approach similar to Holsti in their study of 50 
major international disputes between 1945 and 1970. Examining their data, one finds that 
mediation was accepted and employed in 31 (62 percent) of the disputes. Judicial methods 
were employed in only 12 (24 percent) of the disputes, while United Nations intervention 
occurred in 42 (84 percent) of the disputes. Northedge and Donelan (1971: 295), citing 
methodological difficulties, were unable to determine the extent of the use of negotiation, but 
it was thought to be the most commonly used method of conflict management. 
 
From this beginning, comparative studies on forms of conflict management began to focus on 
aspects of third-party intervention. Butterworth’s (1976) seminal work offered a detailed 
account of institutional intervention in international disputes, and noted that of 310 disputes 
between 1945 and 1974, a third party was involved in 255 (82 percent) of the cases. Zacher 
(1979), for his part, concentrated on the involvement of regional organizations in 
international disputes. He found that such organizations were involved in 40 (34.5 percent) 
out of a total of 116 disputes between 1945 and 1977. While these studies provide a snapshot 
of the frequency with which states tend to use certain methods of conflict management to 
resolve their disputes, no attempt has yet been made to determine what factors influence the 
choice of method, or why states might accept negotiation in one dispute and mediation in 
another. 
 
A number of studies have addressed the question from a prescriptive viewpoint. States are 
encouraged to adopt specific conflict management strategies under a set of predetermined 
conditions (see Bartos 1995; Brams 1975; Rapoport 1960; Schelling 1960; Siebe 1991; 
Young 1975). Other studies, mainly in the area of third-party intervention, have tried to 
describe in theoretical terms the conditions under which mediation is accepted. Touval and 
Zartman (1989), for example, argue that once the parties have reached a ―hurting stalemate,‖ 
they are apt to call for mediation. Neither the prescriptive nor the descriptive approaches have 
thus far been systematically analyzed using real cases of international conflict management. 
We simply do not know when negotiation or mediation will be accepted, nor when either 
might be effective.  
 
There are relatively few formal attempts to present a procedural choice model in international 
conflict management. In a study of third-party techniques, Dixon (1996) draws an implicit 
model of mediation acceptance. He suggests that mediation acceptance is a function of: 
 
(1) the proclivities and capabilities of managing agents; 
(2) the predisposition of the parties to accept management offers; and 
(3) the opportunities and constraints arising from the systemic context or specific 
conflict situation (Dixon 1996: 678). 
 
A more comprehensive and systematized framework of acceptance of mediation comes from 
Stephens (1988). He identifies a series of background, conflict, and mediator characteristics 
which interact independently to influence the probability that a party will accept a particular 
mediation initiative. Neither of these frameworks has been used in a systematic study of 
international mediation.  
 
Disputing parties choose negotiation or mediation (or, indeed, any other method) because of 
their levels of concern for their own and their opponent’s outcomes — the Dual Concern 
Model. At the level of international politics, this is expressed in terms of competitive versus 
cooperative orientations (Fisher 1990: 187). Second, parties will choose a strategy if it is 
feasible and will in all likelihood allow them to realize their conflict goals — the Perceived 
Feasibility Model. International actors thus undertake a cost-benefit analysis of the viability 
of negotiations, unilateral actions, or mediation. Third, situational or contextual factors 
determine the choice and acceptability of a given conflict management strategy. In the 
following section, we propose to examine this argument by developing a framework that 





A New Approach to Negotiation and Mediation? 
 
The methodological approach employed in this study is similar to that used in other 
quantitative studies of international negotiation (Druckman 1997; Druckman et al. 1999) and 
mediation (Bercovitch et al. 1991; Dixon 1996; Fisher 1995; Raymond and Kegley 1985; 
Wall 1981). It has its origins in the pioneering model developed by Sawyer and Guetzkow 
(1965), and subsequently elaborated by Druckman (1973 and 1997). Originally drawing on 
research in social psychology, these authors developed an elaborate framework that 
distinguishes among antecedent factors (issues and background factors), concurrent factors 
(processes and conditions), and consequences (outcomes). Termed the Contingency 
Framework, the approach is predicated on the notion that conflict management is a social 
process whose acceptance and outcomes are dependent upon, or contingent on, aspects of the 
structure and process of the conflict. That is, outcomes are determined by the interaction of 
certain input variables mediated through the structure and actual situation of the conflict 
management (Bercovitch 1984: 140). 
 
The Sawyer and Guetzkow framework has been used in a variety of ways: for example, to 
organize reviews of research literature (Druckman 1973; Wall 1981); to structure analyses of 
cases (Ramberg 1978); to guide the design of experimental simulations (Bonham 1971; 
Druckman 1993a); and to provide dimensions for diagnosing negotiating flexibility 
(Druckman 1993b). This framework offers the advantage of enabling researchers to focus on 
a single case of conflict management or study a large number of cases, and it is applicable 
across contexts. Here we use the framework to study the conditions under which negotiation 
or mediation will take place in international relations. 
 
Shown schematically in Figure One, the Sawyer and Guetzkow-inspired contingency 
approach suggests first, that conflict management takes place in three time dimensions: 
antecedent, or the past; concurrent, or the present; and consequent, or the future. The 
antecedent dimension refers to all those inputs and variables which exist prior to engaging in 
a particular conflict management activity. The concurrent dimension, on the other hand, 
describes a range of factors which characterize the conditions and process of a particular 




















Contingency Framework of International Negotiation 
  

























Source: adapted from Sawyer and Guetzkow 1965 
 
 
The Contingency Model stipulates three clusters of variables with specific operational 
criteria, each of which may have an impact on the process and outcome of the conflict 
management. The first cluster, contextual variables, refers to the nature of the dispute, the 
nature of the parties involved, and their relationship. We wish to know about such factors as 
the type and complexity of the issues in dispute, the intensity of the conflict, the relative 
power of the parties, and the presence of additional parties. The process variables cluster 
refers to activities that take place during the conflict management itself, such as timing, the 
environment or the initiator of negotiation or mediation. The model assumes, for example, 
that the timing of conflict management (e.g., early in the conflict before positions have 
hardened or late in the conflict when a ―hurting stalemate‖ has set in) will affect the parties’ 
choice of conflict management strategy. In the final cluster are outcome variables, which 
refer to the conditions under which negotiation and mediation are accepted, chosen and 
employed (we do not analyze their effectiveness here; only the conditions under which these 
are chosen).  
 
The Contingency Model is a descriptive-analytical approach. It relies on quantitative methods 
which stipulate variables, attributes, and relationships in the search for factors which shed 
light on negotiation and mediation acceptance. By coding a large number of cases in terms of 
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coding the variables in terms of the processes identified by the framework, we are able to 
explore relationships among those variables in a manner similar to experimental analysis 
(Druckman et al. 1999: 105). Like other analytical approaches, the contingency approach 
proceeds along the following steps: 
 
(1) conceptualizing the problem; 
(2) developing a data set; 
(3) testing relationships between aspects of the data; and 
(4) confirming or modifying the initial conceptualization. 
 
Even though this study is exploratory in nature, these steps guide the research design and 
interpretation. The contingency approach, therefore, is an organizing framework rather than a 
theory of conflict management, although it does facilitate theory development (Bercovitch 
and Langley 1993: 673). 
 
Data and Method 
 
In order to examine the conditions under which negotiation or mediation are chosen in 
international conflict, it was necessary to obtain information on their incidence. A data set 
describing the occurrence and patterns of international disputes for the period 1945 to 1995 
was created. For empirical reasons, conflicts were included in the data if they conformed to 
the following criteria: 
 
(1) they involved two states (one of the states may have been involved indirectly 
through the experience of a civil conflict; and 
(2) they were characterized by a significant use of force (e.g., ranging from open 
warfare to military buildups and threats) regardless of the actual number of fatalities. 
 
The data set, therefore, includes interstate wars, internationalized civil wars, and militarized 
disputes (see Bercovitch and Jackson 1997). In total, 295 international disputes were 
identified as having taken place in the 1945-1955 period. 
 
The primary events data sources used to scan the period were the New York Times, Keesings 
Archives (latterly Keesings Record of World Events), The Times (London), Reuters Online 
News Service, and a range of books and articles describing specific cases (Brecher, 
Wilkenfeld, and Moser 1988; Brogan 1992; Butterworth 1976; Day 1987; Tillema 1991). 
Data on conflicts and state characteristics was taken from a variety of authoritative sources, 
such as the Stateman’s Year-book (various editions), Freedom in the World, World Military 
and Social Expenditures (various years), various United Nations publications, and numerous 
other sources summarizing state and world-level quantitative data (see Cook and Paxton 
1979; Sherman 1987). Each of 295 international disputes was thus coded in terms of many 
independent variables describing features of the conflict, issues and parties involved, and 
nature and outcome of conflict management. 
 
Seventy-five of the 295 disputes experienced no formal conflict management efforts at all 
(e.g., China-Vietnam 1983; Thailand-Kampuchea 1976). Forty-nine of the disputes 
experienced negotiation only (e.g., Zaire-Zambia 1982, Guinea-Bissaw-Senegal 1990). Fifty 
disputes experienced mediation only (e.g., Mali-Burkina Fasso 1986, Nicaragua-Costa Rica, 
1985). And 121 disputes experienced episodes of negotiation as well as mediation (e.g., U.S.- 
Dominican Republic 1965, Libya-Chad 1982 to 1995).  
 
In those disputes where negotiations and/or mediation did take place, it is important to realize 
that there was more than one attempt per dispute. In some disputes, negotiation and/or 
mediation were tried many times (there were, for instance, 190 different mediation attempts 
in the Yugoslav dispute). We have identified a total of 1,154 formal negotiation efforts, and 
1,858 formal mediation efforts in these disputes. These cases form our units of analysis, and 




It has been noted that the outbreak of violent conflict in international politics is usually 
associated with the breaking off of diplomatic relations (Frankel 1969: 146). Negotiation 
functions best under conditions of ―normal diplomacy,‖ and not the ―one-off‖ situation of 
armed conflict (Princen 1992: 7-8). In this sense, mediation can serve as a regime surrogate 
because, in disputes involving armed conflict, institutionalization is impractical. Normal 
diplomatic negotiations are also impeded by hostility, which is generally higher in 
international politics, especially when force has been used (Rubin, Pruitt, and Kim 1994: 203-
204; Keashly and Fisher 1996: 244-245). In cases of civil or intra-state conflict, bilateral 
negotiations are often impossible, because a government does not wish to be seen to negotiate 
with insurgents, lest the latter gain some legitimacy from it (Mitchell 1991: 277). 
 
For these reasons, we suggest that intense antagonism prevents direct negotiations and makes 
mediation more likely (Stephens 1988: 57). As the general distribution of negotiation and 
mediation reported above reveals, this is indeed the case. In intense international disputes, 
mediation is far more likely to be chosen than negotiation. 
 
However, we wish to go beyond the general finding of the distribution of cases and examine 
the specific conditions under which negotiation or mediation are chosen. Using variables 
identified in the contingency framework, we cross-tabulated a large number of contextual and 
process variables with negotiation and mediation acceptance. In the following sections we 





The effect of the issues in dispute on the utilization of conflict management procedures 
relates to their substance, number, and complexity. It is an often articulated proposition in 
conflict research that tangible issues (e.g., concrete, measureable issues such as money, 
resources, territory) are more amenable to successful conflict management than intangible 
issues involving beliefs, principles, ideologies, legitimacy, and images (Bercovitch 1984; 
Bercovitch and Langley 1993; Ott 1972; Lall 1966; Klieboer 1996; Kressel and Pruitt 1989). 
Numerous studies have confirmed that intangible issues are the most difficult to resolve and 
depress success rates (Bingham 1986; Hiltrop 1989; Kressel and Pruitt 1989; Pruitt et al. 
1989). Complex intangible issues create difficulties between the parties, difficulties which 
may be overcome only by a skilled mediator. 
 
It is also argued that the greater the number and complexity of issues, the less likely they are 
to be peacefully resolved (Bercovitch and Langley 1993; Kolb 1983; Moore 1986). On the 
other hand, it has also been suggested that greater issue complexity creates opportunities for 
tradeoffs, sequencing, and packaging, thus enhancing the chances of success (Lax and 
Sebenius 1986; Raiffa 1982; Bercovitch and Langley 1993). We maintain that the former 
proposition is more indicative of what happens in international conflict, and that when the 
issues are numerous and complex, states will choose or accept mediation rather than try and 
engage in potentially fruitless negotiations. 
 
Examining the data, Table One shows the relationship between the choice of negotiation or 
mediation and the nature of the issues; namely, whether they are tangible or intangible issues. 
The data reveals that, when parties are contesting relatively straightforward tangible issues 
(e.g., terms of independence for former colonies, access to or control over resources), 
negotiation is the primary procedural choice. Intangible issues involving ideology, security, 
or ethnic identities, on the other hand, is less likely to be effectively dealt with by bilateral 
negotiations. When such intangible issues are at the heart of a dispute, mediation is the 




Type of Issue and Procedural Choice 
 
 
Conflict Management Procedure                         Issue Type 
                                                                               Tangible            Intangible             Totals 
 
 
Mediation             Count                                            552                    1306                  1858 
                             % within mediation                     29.7%                 70.3%               100.0% 
                             % within issue type                     45.4%                 72.8%                 61.7% 
 
Negotiation          Count                                            665                     489                    1154 
                             % within negotiation                   57.6%                 42.4%                100.0% 
                             % within issue type                     54.6%                 27.2%                  38.3% 
 
Total                     Count                                           1217                   1795                   3012 
                             % within procedure                     40.4%                 59.6%                100.0% 
                             % within issue type                   100.0%                100.0%               100.0% 
 
X2 = 230.392 df = 1 p< .000 
 
Nature of the Dispute 
 
One of the most important factors determining the choice of a conflict management 
procedure is the level of conflict intensity. When disputants can sort out their differences 
bilaterally, without interference from outside parties, they normally will. However, when the 
level of hostility between the parties is so high that they cannot negotiate face-to-face, 
mediation becomes necessary. Numerous studies have shown that when a conflict is not too 
intense, disputants will prefer to resolve their conflict without third-party assistance (Johnson 
and Tullar 1972; Bigoness 1976; Johnson and Pruitt 1972; Hiltrop and Rubin 1982). In other 
words, ―when a conflict is of low intensity or is narrow in scope, the parties feel they can 
manage nicely by themselves and do not seek assistance from a mediator‖ (Wall and Lynn 
1993: 164; see also Heuer and Penrod 1986: 701; and Rubin 1980). In fact, in such 
circumstances many parties perceive third-party intervention as an unwanted intrusion 
(Rubin, Pruitt and Kim 1994: 214).  
 
In our empirical study, we examined conflict intensity using the number of fatalities in a 
conflict, and the relationship between conflict management and the number of fatalities is 
shown in Table Two. The data supports the notion that, in conflicts that are not too intense, 
parties prefer to resolve their differences through negotiation. For example, when a conflict 
has fewer than 500 fatalities, negotiation is the preferred conflict management method is 
nearly 55 percent of the cases. At the other end of the spectrum, when conflicts experience 
more than 10,000 fatalities, mediation is the chosen method in 69.9 percent of the cases. High 
levels of fatalities are indicative of high levels of hostility. In such cases, a mediator may 
have to shuttle between the parties as a go-between or communicator to achieve any 




Fatalities and Procedural Choice 
 
 
Conflict Management                                                       Fatalities 
Procedure                                             0-500      501-      1001-      5001-      10000+      Total 
                                                                            1000      5000       10000 
 
 
Mediation       Count                            251          65          180         95          1259           1850* 
                        % within mediation    13.6%     3.5%        9.7%     5.1%       68.1%       100.0% 
                        % within fatalities      45.2%    48.9%     50.0%    61.3%      69.9%         61.6% 
 
Negotiation    Count                            304          68          180         60           541             1153* 
                       % within negot.           26.4%     5.9%       15.6%    5.2%       46.9%       100.0% 
                       % within fatalities       54.8%   51.1%       50.0%   38.7%      30.1%         38.4% 
 
Total               Count                           555         133          360        155         1800            3003 
                       % within procedure     18.5%     4.4%       12.0%    5.2%      59.9%        100.0% 
                       % within fatalities     100.0%  100.0%     100.0%  100.0%   100.0%      100.0% 
 
X2 = 145.498 df = 4 p< .000 
 
* Total number of mediation and negotiation attempts does not add up to 1858 and 
1154 respectively as fatalities were unknown in one dispute. 
 
Nature of the Parties 
 
There is some suggestion in the literature that the choice of a strategy is affected by the 
nature and identity of parties. It is generally agreed that, when parties to a conflict are 
different in terms of their identity and power capabilities, direct negotiations may not be 
possible (Bercovitch and Houston 1996; Kleiboer 1996; Pruitt and Carnevale 1993). More 
specifically, when parties to a conflict do not share either the same political system or the 
same set of cultural norms and values, negotiation becomes very difficult indeed. This is 
because ―shared norms and sociopolitical similarity minimize misperception and facilitate a 
successful conclusion to the conflict‖ (Bercovitch and Houston 1996: 21). 
 
Similarly, many analysts argue that successful conflict management requires a (rough) power 
parity between the parties, because disparity will dispose the stronger party to reject 
negotiation in the first place, or at least resist a compromise (Young 1967; Zartman 1981; 
Kriesberg 1982; Touval 1982; Kleiboer 1996). On the other hand, others argue that power 
parity endangers successful conflict management because it stimulates competition and 
attempts to upset the power balance (Organski 1960; Wright 1965; Kleiboer 1996). 
 
The empirical analysis indicates that power disparity between the disputants (the power of 
each state was examined in terms of its gross national product (GNP), GNP per capita, 
military spending, territory, and population) does have an important bearing on the choice of 
conflict management strategy. Large differences in power capabilities impede negotiations. 
Table Three explores the relationship between the relative capabilities of the parties and their 
choice of a conflict management procedure. 
 
The data supports the notion that, as the power disparity between the disputants rises, 
mediation will be the preferred conflict management mode. When the power disparity is at its 
highest level, mediation was the preferred conflict management method in more than 60 
percent of the cases as compared with only 39 percent preference for negotiation. 
 
Table Three 
Power Disparity and Procedural Choice 
 
 
Conflict Management Procedure                                  Power Disparity 
                                                                      Low         Medium        High              Totals 
 
 
Mediation             Count                               596             675              523                1794* 
                              % within mediation        33.2%        37.6%          29.2%           100.0% 
                              % within power disp.     57.5%         66.4%         60.8%             61.7% 
 
Negotiation          Count                                441            342               337                1120* 
                             % within negotiation       39.4%         30.5%          30.1%           100.0% 
                             % within power disp.      42.5%         33.6%          39.2%             38.3% 
 
Total                     Count                               1037           1017             860                 2914 
                              % within procedure         35.6%        34.9%           29.5%          100.0% 
                              % within power disp.    100.0%      100.0%         100.0%           100.0% 
 
X2 = 17.471 df = 2 p< .000 
 
* Total number of mediation and negotiation attempts does not add up to 1858 and 
1154 respectively, as some disputes involved a non-state actor (no power profile can 
be ascertained for a non-state actor). 
 
Related to the cultural norms and values of a party is the degree of cultural fragmentation, or 
homogeneity. It has been claimed that the greater the degree of fractionation within a state, 
the greater the chances of conflict management failure (Bercovitch and Houston 1996; 
Kleiboer 1996). This is because representatives (e.g., negotiators) find it difficult to make 
concessions without losing face vis-à-vis different constituencies, and greater levels of intra-
party bargaining are required first. We want to suggest, therefore, that conflicts characterized 
by divergent cultural norms and values, socio-political dissimilarities, and high fractionation 
are more likely to be characterized by the use of mediation. 
 
Table Four explores the relationship between the acceptance of negotiation or mediation and 
party fractionation. The data reveals that, when one or both of the disputing parties is highly 
fragmented, mediation is the preferred mode of conflict management. For example, when 
both parties are fragmented, mediation is the accepted procedural choice in 70.8 percent of 
the cases. A skilled mediator can help the parties save face with their constituencies, facilitate 
communication, and aid with intra-party negotiations. 
 
Table Four 
Party Fractionation and Procedural Choice 
 
 
Conflict Management Procedure                                Party Fractionation 
                                                                           Low       Medium        High         Totals 
 
 
Mediation         Count                                         714           663            481            1858 
                          % within mediation                 38.4%      335.7%      25.9%          100.0% 
                          % within fractionation             55.1%        64.0%     70.8%             61.7% 
 
Negotiation       Count                                         583          373            198             1154 
                          % within negotiation               50.5%        32.3%      17.2%          100.0% 
                          % within fractionation             44.9%        36.0%      29.2%            38.3% 
 
Total                  Count                                        1297        1036           679             3012 
                           % within procedure                 43.1%       34.4%       22.5%         100.0% 
                           % within fractionation          100.0%      100.0%     100.0%         100.0% 
 




Procedural choice in conflict management is not simply a matter of the relative perceived or 
actual merits of one method over another. Disputants choose a method of conflict 
management using a calculus that takes into account their concern for their own and their 
opponent’s outcomes, the feasibility, costs, and benefits associated with different methods, as 
well as the nature of the conflict and its situational context. Understanding the parties’ 
preference for dealing with their conflicts must include knowledge of the context in which 
their conflict takes place.  
 
Our study has examined some of the most important contextual factors that influence whether 
states will choose negotiation or mediation. We have investigated these factors in an 
empirical manner, and found that a number of key factors related to the issues in conflict, the 
nature of the dispute, and the nature of the parties impact on the choice of negotiation or 
mediation. As such, we have confirmed the oft-repeated (but until now, unverified) notion 
that mediation will be chosen and employed by states when the conflict is long, drawn out, 
intense, and complex, and the parties are willing to break their stalemate by cooperating with 
each other and engaging in some contact and communication (Bercovitch 1991: 17). When, 
on the other hand, the conflict structure is simpler and less intense, parties will most likely 
resolve it themselves through bilateral negotiations. In such circumstances, the parties may 
perceive third-party intervention as an unwanted intrusion and even resist it. 
 
There is at least one caveat to this, however: the results of our study suggest that, even if the 
nature of the dispute is relatively straightforward, negotiation may be impeded by the parties 
themselves. If they are very different in terms of their capabilities, if one or both of them are 
fragmented, or if they lack the political will to initiate talks, for example, mediation may then 
have to be employed. 
 
The problem of coping with, or managing, conflicts remains one of the most important 
challenges confronting all of us. Here we have tried to answer this problem by examining the 
circumstances under which international actors pursue the strategy of negotiation or 
mediation. Rather than offer a prescriptive template, and suggest that it can be applied to all 
conflicts, we have tried to examine — theoretically and empirically — the constraints and 
opportunities of reverting to negotiation or mediation to settle a conflict. We found that a 
number of contextual factors can affect this choice: moderate levels of conflict, a relatively 
simple issue structure, homogenous parties, and a willingness to reach a settlement 
predispose states to use negotiations. High levels of conflict, complex issue-structure, 
heterogeneous parties, and a low motivation to reach an agreement make mediation the more 
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